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Abstract 
Fairly recently, a novel image encryption based on Arnold scrambling and Lucas series has 
been proposed in the literature [27]. The scheme design is based on permutation-substitution 
operations, where Arnold map is used to permute pixels for some   rounds, and Lucas 
sequence is used to mask the image and substitute pixel’s values. The authors of the 
cryptosystem have claimed, after several statistical analyses, that their system is “with high 
efficiency” and resists chosen and known plaintext attacks. Negatively, in this paper we 
showed the opposite. The key space of the scheme under study could be reduced considerably 
after our equivalent keys analysis, and thus the system is breakable under reasonable brute 
force attack. After all, the design of the scheme has several weaknesses that make it weak 
against chosen and known plaintext attacks.  Consequently, we do not recommend the use of 
this system for any cryptographic concern or security purpose. 
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1. Introduction 
With the rapid growth and development of modern telecommunication networks that pushes the limits 
of communication and information transmission, so many types of data have become more susceptible 
to be transmitted over networks without further processing or changing in their structure [1]. 
Multimedia data is one type of data that is widely exchanged over public networks and seldom used 
by public community [2-3]. A simple scenario of an eavesdropper spying on the network traffic would 
perceive the huge amount of proper information that could be collected about people and 
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organizations. Thus, the security of data generally and multimedia data especially becomes a serious 
concern of many people and organizations. 
Cryptographic protocols are one basic layer for securing data transmissions over public networks. 
Cryptography is, with no doubt, still the best approach to secure data and protect confidentiality of 
people. Modern cryptography is based on the idea of confusion-diffusion depicted by Claud Shanon in 
1945 [4]. Confusion refers to making the relationship between the key and the ciphertext as complex 
as possible while diffusion refers to the property that the redundancy in the statistics of the plaintext is 
"dissipated" in the statistics of the ciphertext. 
Multimedia data and especially image data by its proper intrinsic characteristics such as bulk data, 
strong correlation between neighboring elements and the need for fast processing algorithms [5], have 
motivated many researchers to adjust some existing cryptosystems to be more adequate for image 
cryptography [6-10]. Other authors decided to design new algorithms tailored specifically for images 
[11-17]. 
Since Arnold encrypted cat image using a chaotic map in 1967 [18], the field of chaos-cryptography 
has become a hot research area. Since then, so many chaotic map based encryption schemes has been 
proposed in the literature [14-17]. Motivated by the strong similarities between chaos theory and 
cryptography requirements [19], authors keep designing day after day new proposals for image and 
multimedia data cryptography based on chaos and other number theory aspects. 
However, the majority of those new proposals have been cryptanalyzed in subsequent publications 
[20-23], and a crypto-game has risen up to the field of multimedia cryptology. The main reason 
behind the inadequacy of the proposed systems is that the majority of them are not well studied 
against cryptanalysis attacks (e.g. chosen/known plaintext attacks …), and so many authors rely only 
on some metrics and statistical analysis such that randomness tests , histogram and entropy analysis, 
correlation analysis, NPCR and UACI tests [24]. Consequently, many guidelines and road maps have 
been proposed [25-26] to ensure some sound level of security. 
In [27], a new cryptosystem based on both Arnold cat map and Lucas series was proposed. The 
system’s design is based on scrambling rounds handled by the Arnold cat map and masking process 
using the Lucas sequence. After several statistical tests done by the authors of [27], they claimed that 
their system is efficiently secure and resists the conventional known attacks like known and chosen 
plaintext attacks.  
Negatively, our analysis has shown that the proposed system has almost no security level and should 
not be used for any cryptographic concern. The system is breakable under possible brute force attack 
after the reduction of the key space using equivalent keys analysis. The key space would never 
overpasses     for high dimension (           image plaintexts. Weak keys do exist, and 
generally every plaintext is recoverable after some well-defined number of successive encryptions. 
Besides, the system is weak against known and chosen plaintext attacks. Although not discussed in 
this paper, the system is seemed to be weak against other attacks such as chosen ciphertext and 
differential attacks. 
The organization of this paper is as follow: section 2 describes the system under study. Section 3 is 
conserved for key space analysis, brute force feasibility and weak keys analysis. Section 4 discuses a 
timing attack on the system. Section 5 describes two attacks: chosen plaintext attack and known 
plaintext attack. Finally section 6 concludes the paper. 
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2. Description of the system under study 
The system under study labelled as IEAL (Image Encryption based on Arnold scrambling and Lucas 
series) is designed for grayscale and color square
3
 images. However, in this paper we suppose that all 
images are 8-bit grayscale square image with size     i.e. image   (            
        (     
            . The cryptanalytic results are extendable to any image color depth. 
IEAL key exchanging is carried out using public key encryption algorithm. The key
4
 consists of two 
integer numbers: the first denoted as   is for scrambling round iterations, and the last one is for the 
first position of Lucas sequence denoted as  . After Diffie-Hellman based key exchanging, IEAL 
encryption process could be described briefly in two main steps: 
1) Image scrambling: 
Taken an input image with size     (denoted in this paper as the plaintext/plain image  ),   
is scrambled   times according to Arnold cat map [18] as follow: 
( 
 
  
)  (     (     
     (     
) (1) 
Where    and    are the new pixel coordinates after each iteration,   and   are the old pixel 
coordinates,     is denoting modular arithmetic. The scrambled image could be formulated 
in function of the plain image as:  
  (        (     (2) 
Where      (   and  
    (  ,    denotes the application of Eq.(1)   times. 
2) Image masking: 
The image    obtained after scrambling stage is masked pixel-by-pixel in raster order with a 
sequence
5
     (      
     obtained from Lucas sequence starting its generation from the 
position   as follow: 
 (        (                       (3) 
Where    is Lucas sequence defined as : 
   {
        
        
             
 (4) 
Thus, we formulate the encrypted image as: 
  (       (      (               (5) 
The all encryption process could be formulated mathematically as follow: 
  (        (      (                 (6) 
Where      (   and  
    (  ,    denotes the application of Eq.(1)   times. 
 
3. Key space analysis 
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As mentioned in the previous section, the key is composed of two integer numbers (     for 
iterations and starting position of Lucas sequence generation respectively. No key space analysis has 
been done in the IEAL’s main article. Our analysis shows that the key space of the IEAL system is 
very weak. 
3.1 Equivalent keys 
From first view, the numbers   and   of iterations and starting position respectively could be any 
integer numbers. However, the system of Eq.(1) has been shown to be periodic [28], and thus,    itself 
is periodic. That is, if  was the period of the system of Eq.(1), then for any secret key  ,     is an 
equivalent key. Thus,   could take only   different values. So that the secret key   is within a pre-
defined set               where   is the period of the map in Eq.(1). Many studies [28,30] have 
shown that  has an upper bound in function of the size   of the image as follow: 
 {
               
                      
 
  
 
                 
       (7) 
Proposition 1: for any image of size    , and for any key (number of iterations)  , all the keys that 
belongs to the set                     are equivalent keys of  . Where   is defined in 
Eq.(7). 
In the other hand, calculations on the sequence   of Eq.(3) has shown that   is periodic by its turn. 
The period of the sequence   after some number of calculations is found to be      . 
Proposition 2: We conjecture that the Lucas sequence modulo    is periodic-384. Thus, for any key   
(start position of the sequence), all the keys of the set                       are equivalent 
keys. 
 
3.2 Key space and brute force attack 
From propositions 1 and 2, the actual space of keys    for a brute force attack could be minimized 
considerably in function of the dimension size   of image as follow: 
  {
                   
                         
 
    
 
                 
       (8) 
For           high dimension images, the key space for brute force attack would never 
overpasses         . However, as depicted in Table 1 this theoretical upper bound value is greater than 
the real value. This is considered as a very weak key space for brute force attack as the minimum key 
space recommended being not less than      [26]. Even more, some calculations depicted on Table 1 
of the key space length according to some image sizes shown that the actual key space size would be 
in some cases very small than the upper bound formulated in Eq.(8).  
Table 1 Key space size according to some image sizes. 
Image size   : The key space for brute force attack: 
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After some computer calculations, and without affecting any cryptanalysis results in this paper, we 
conjecture that for any image size of       with     the key space size would be        
                       . 
After our key space analysis, and considering the tiny structure of the cryptosystem (upper bound of 
complexity  (     with   is the size of the image      ), we could claim that the system IEAL 
is extremely weak under brute force attack. In Fig. 1 we show the result of a brute force attack on an 
unknown         cipher image encrypted using randomly generated pair of keys (     
(       . Note that all keys used for encryption and illustrations in this paper are generated using 
rand function from octave
6
, and that all images used in this paper for illustration purpose are from 
SIPI
7
 database. The brute force attack ends after 29.454 seconds recovering the original plaintext  
with an equivalent key (       (    . That is,     (                   (          . 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 1 The proposed brute force attack. (a) cipher image of size        , (b) recovered plain image 
after 29.4 seconds 
3.3 Weak keys  
In cryptology, weak keys are keys that lead to some undesired results (e.g. no or bad encryption, self-
decryption…). The issue arises when the probability of picking up a weak key randomly is not 
negligible. However, for any cryptographic system, it is better worth to exclude all weak keys from 
the key space. 
In this approach, if re-encrypting the same image with the same key leads to decrypting the image, 
thus, the key pair is considered as a weak key. For any key   ( start position), if the key   is chosen to 
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be in the form        , where  is the period as defined above in Eq.(7), then the pair (     is a 
weak key, because after two encryptions with the same key we will reproduce the original image. 
According to Eq.(6) the first encrypted image is : 
  (        (      (         (9) 
Since there is no scrambling because       is equivalent to zero according to proposition 1, and 
thus no scrambling is done on the original image, only masking operation remains: 
  (      (      (       (10) 
For the second encryption, another cipher image is obtained as: 
  (       (      (       (11) 
By substituting     in Eq.(11) we obtain: 
  (      (      (        (        (     (12) 
Thus, the original image is obtained by re-encrypting the encrypted one. Consequently, the pair of this 
particular key is considered as weak key. The probability of picking up a weak key is      ⁄ , 
where  is defined in Eq.(7) (e.g. for         size image the probability of picking up a weak key 
is of 8.33% which is not negligible at all). 
Fig. 2 illustrates this type of weakness, after re-encrypting the         size cipher image encrypted 
with the randomly generated key      , and a chosen           we recovered the original 
plain image by simple application of a second encryption to the cipher image. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Fig. 2 Illustration of a weak key encryption (a) original image, (b) cipher image after the first 
encryption of the original image, (c) cipher image after the second encryption of the original image 
which is the original one. 
3.3.1 Generalized cycle attack 
 Let us consider that an attacker could perform any number of re-encryptions for a particular unknown 
plaintext using the same unknown pair of key (    . This typical attack could be seen as a type of 
chosen plaintext attack.  
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Proposition 3: Only   
  
    (   
 re-encryption is needed to obtain the original plain image by the 
generalized re-encryption attack, where   is the period as defined in Eq.(7) and     (     is the 
greatest common divisor of integer numbers   and  . 
Proof: trivially proved from the fact that given a number of iterations  , and the period of iteration is 
 , thus, one needs   
   (   
 
 another iteration to obtain the original image, where    (     is the 
least common multiple of two integers   and  . 
In order to dissipate masking effect, we need another   application of the encryption process. 
Thus, we need   
   (   
 
   successive encryptions to recover the original plain image. 
Since for any two positive integers   and  we have:    (        (       , we finally get : 
  
   (   
 
   
  
      (   
   
  
    (   
 (13) 
  
This attack allows us to recover not only the plain image but also to recover keys after enhancing the 
brute force attack to a dictionary attack by limiting the values that the key   could take for scrambling 
process according to the following equality: 
   (     
  
 
 (14) 
As for illustration purpose, we consider an          cipher image shown in Fig. 3. By application 
of successive re-encryptions we end up by recovering the plain image after 24 encryptions as shown 
in Fig.3. From Table 1 we have     . From Eq.(14) we have:    (      
    
  
  . Since from 
proposition 1               we conclude that             , that is, the secret key used for 
encryption in Fig.3 has been chosen randomly to be (     (      . 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
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(d) 
 
(e) 
 
(f) 
 
(g) 
 
(h) 
 
(i) 
Fig. 3 generalized cycle attack (a) the original image (b) cipher image after 3 encryptions (c) after 6 
encryptions (d) after 9 encryptions (e) after 12 encryptions (f) after 15 encryptions (g) after 18 
encryptions (h) after 21 encryptions (i) after 24 encryptions which is the same plain image. 
 
4. Timing attack 
In this section, we discuss the applicability of a side-channel attack based on time consumption 
measure. Thus, we consider that an attacker has the ability to access or obtain some statistical analysis 
of timing measurements of the cryptosystem for encrypting some unknown plaintexts with unknown 
keys. 
For a given data inputs: plain image with size       and a pair of secret key (    , assuming no 
optimizations are done on the encryption algorithm, the complexity of the algorithm could be of: 
 (          ( (      (15) 
Since the time execution increases with number of iterations, and that only one masking operation is 
done whatever the key is. The number of iterations could be considered as the only parameter that 
affects time execution metrics. Actually, timing attack is more dependent on the processor design and 
the code optimization, but since the number of iterations constitutes a half-key, this attack could be 
successfully exploited to reveal half of the key or to enhance considerably a brute force attack by 
setting up a dictionary attack on  . 
5. Chosen plaintext and known plaintext attack 
In [27] the authors of IEAL system have declared that their proposed system resists chosen/known 
attacks, negatively, this claim is not true. In the next two subsections we discuss the weakness of 
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IEAL against chosen and known plaintext attacks. Moreover we could claim that the IEAL 
cryptosystem is weak also under several other types of attacks like chosen ciphertext and differential 
attack.  
5.1 chosen plaintext attack 
In a chosen plaintext attack scenario, the attacker has temporary access to the encryption machinery, 
and he could choose some intentionally designed plaintexts to be encrypted using unknown key. In 
our case of study, we will demonstrate that the maximum required plaintexts to recover an equivalent 
key of the encryption are ⌈        (  ⌉    chosen plaintexts where ⌈ ⌉ denotes the ceil function, 
that is the smallest integer not smaller than (.). 
 Recovering the masking key: 
To recover the masking Lucas sequence, we have first to get ride off scrambling process by 
introducing an all-zero pixel plain image       (      where   (       for           
and        . After encrypting   we will get a cipher image   
  with blocks of the 
equivalent key since from Eq.(6) we have : 
  
 (       (      (        (               (16) 
 Recovering the scrambling map: 
After recovering the masking key, the scheme could be seen as a permutation-only encryption 
scheme, thus, as demonstrated in [29], only a number of ⌈      (    ⌉ of chosen 
plaintexts is required to recover the scrambling equivalent key. 
Thus, the total number of required chosen plaintexts to recover the full equivalent key for encryption 
is ⌈        (  ⌉   . As for           image size, we need only 3 chosen plaintexts to recover 
an equivalent key.  
5.2 Known plaintext attack 
For known plaintext attack, the attacker knows some plaintexts and their corresponding ciphertexts. 
The attacker would try to recover the unknown key or part of it. If this is done, then the system would 
be considered as unsecure. 
From this perspective and by exploiting the attack described in the subsection 3.3, we could recover 
the pair of keys (   ) by a dictionary attack made up by exploiting information from one pair of 
known plaintext/ciphertext. Consider that we have pair of plaintext/ciphertext denoted as   and  . 
 Recovering the key/equivalent key of   : 
First of all, let us determine if any fixed points exist in the Arnold map, by solving the 
following system: 
{
    (       
     (       
                   (17) 
Obviously, the only fixed point is the point (0,0). Hence, the pixel with coordinates (0,0) 
would never changes its position whatever the key   was. The first element of the sequence   
could be obtained as: 
 (    (      (     (18) 
Since   contains same elements but those elements are shifted dependently on the value of   
key, the position of  (   will narrow up the size of the dictionary of   key. Table 2 shows that 
the size of dictionary for   key could take only 4 values depending on the value of  (  . The 
probability of using each size value is also depicted in Table 2. Measures shown in table 2 are 
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simply calculated from the statistical analysis of the 384-length Lucas sequence used in the 
IEAL cryptosystem. For each value of probable key  ̂, we decrypt masking-only operation 
and we compare the histogram of the encrypted image  ̂ with the histogram of the plain 
image  . If the two histograms matches, then the key (or equivalent key of  ) is    ̂. 
 Recovering the key/equivalent key of   : 
After the recovery of the key  , we could perform the cycle attack on an scrambled-only 
version of the plain image which is  ̂ using one iteration for each encryption  ̂   . Since no 
masking process is done, and after recovering the plain image, say after   scrambling-only 
encryption, the equivalent key for   could be recovered as:      . Where   is defined 
in Eq.(7). This result could be proved easily by the fact that   scrambling is equivalent to 
zero, thus     is equivalent to zero. Hence,    is the key   or an equivalent key of it. 
Table 2 size of dictionary attack for   key using known plaintext attack and the probability of 
using each dictionary size. 
Size of dictionary for   key 
using known plaintext attack: 
Probability of using this dictionary size: 
          ⁄         
          ⁄         
           ⁄      
           ⁄         
 
Fig. 4 illustrates known plaintext attack using         size images. The objective is to recover the 
key (or equivalent key) which is supposed to be unknown. The known plaintext is shown in Fig. 4(a), 
its corresponding known ciphertext is shown in Fig. 4(b). The main attack’s process is demonstrated 
in the next few steps: 
- Calculation of  (   according to Eq.(18):  (    (      (        . 
- The dictionary size is    , since  (   exists only once in the 384-length Lucas sequence. 
- Calculation of   gives,      . 
- Decryption of masking-only process of   produces a scrambled-only image  ̂ shown in Fig. 
4(c). 
- Successive scrambling encryptions of the intermediate cipher image  ̂ leads to the recovery 
of the plain image   after      encryptions. The recovered image is shown in Fig. 4(d). 
- The calculation of   gives        . Note that from table 1, we have    . 
- The recovered equivalent key is (     (      , that is, the original key was (     
(      . 
- Use the recovered key to decrypt the cipher image shown in Fig. 4(e). 
- Decrypted image is shown in Fig. 4(f) which is exactly the unknown plain image. 
Note that this method is not the only (nor maybe the best) method for implementing a known plaintext 
attack against the IEAL system. The method depicted in this subsection is to prove the weakness of 
the IEAL system against known plaintext attack. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
 
(e) 
 
(f) 
Fig 4 the proposed known plaintext attack (a) the known plaintext (b) the known ciphertext (c) 
scrambled only cipher (d) the encountered plaintext (e) cipher text of unknown image (f) the 
recovered image  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we scrutinize the design of a recently proposed cryptosystem for image encryption 
based on Arnold scrambling and Lucas series masking. The scheme under study is proved in this 
paper to be inappropriate for cryptographic use. Yet, the underlined algorithm exhibits bad secrecy 
insurance and many imperiled typical algorithmic flaws. Although the system did pass several 
statistical tests, it cannot resist conventional attacks such as chosen plaintext and known plaintext 
attacks. Even worst, the system is breakable under feasible brute force attack after the reduction of the 
key space by our equivalent keys analysis. In addition to that, the existence of many weak keys and its 
vulnerability against cycle attack (successive encryptions) completely makes the cryptosystem faulty 
and with no sound secrecy. Lastly, we do not recommend the use of this cryptosystem for any 
information security and data protection concern. 
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